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Summary 
This report presents research into constraints and opportunities within traditional fresh 
and dried cassava marketing in Uganda. DFID's Crop Post Harvest Programme, 
DFID's bi-lateral aid section in Kampala and the East African Research Network 
funded the research. 
Key findings 
• Dried cassava flour is an important food staple for particular groups of poor 
consumers within Kampala. Real cassava flour prices in Kampala are volatile and 
increasing in the long term, suggesting that food-security among sections of the 
urban poor may be threatened. 
• Improving the flow of market information would increase dried cassava marketing 
efficiency. This would lead to better spatial integration between urban markets 
(thereby reducing the absolute levels and volatility of consumer prices, and 
increasing marketing opportunities for farmers), and to a reduction of transaction 
costs throughout the marketing chain, particularly to the benefit of farmers. 
• Efficiency could also be improved by increasing liquidity within the dried cassava 
trading chain. Greater capital availability would allow wholesalers and retailers to 
expand the scale of their businesses and spread their overhead costs over a greater 
volume of trade. Food retailing in general has poor cost efficiency, and 
consequently consumer food prices are much higher than is necessary. In the case 
of cassava flour, retailers add approximately 3 6% to the price of flour in between 
buying and selling, yet the greatest part of this margin is accounted for by 
overhead costs. Retailing is a simple service and should not cost consumers so 
highly. 
• Product quality is not a problem during the dry season, when optimal drying 
conditions permit sufficient dried cassava production that is of adequate quality 
and affordable to urban consumers. However, during the wet season, good quality 
flour becomes expensive, not only because of low levels of inter-seasonal storage 
but also because farmers are unable to dry cassava roots effectively. Appropriate 
drying technologies might improve the situation, but they would have to be both 
non-labour and non-capital intensive to find favour within prevailing farming 
systems. 
• Current market facilities constrain wholesaling efficiency. Competition with 
alternative land uses limits business expansion, maintains high rents, and creates 
congestion and pollution. 
• There is no evidence that any group within the dried cassava trading chain makes 
unjustifiably large profits. On the contrary, excessive competition at the retail 
level appears to squeeze profits to the extent that individual retail outlets operate 
at an inefficiently small scale. 
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• Fresh cassava trading is driven by the high perishability ofthe roots and by the 
price premia that consumers are willing to pay for freshness. 
• Large marketing cost savings could be realised if current methods for reducing the 
perishability of cassava roots can be adapted to meet the requirements of 
Uganda's fresh cassava trade. 
• Recent cassava breeding research has neglected widespread consumer preferences 
for medium sized, sweet varieties. 
• Transport charges between farms and assembly points are more than ten times 
more expensive than inter-urban transport charges. Although this finding was 
made in the context of dried cassava trading, it probably applies to most 
domestically marketed farm produce, and may indicate the importance of public 
investment in reducing the costs of community level transport. 
• Lending to the food marketing sector is not only constrained by high transaction 
costs and poor loan security but also by conservative attitudes among potential 
borrowers. 
Recommendations 
Many of the constraints that apply to fresh and dried cassava trading are common to 
other types of food marketing in Uganda. Examining cassava marketing in isolation 
can therefore lead to less than optimal research impact. The following are suggested 
as avenues of general food marketing research and technical assistance. 
• F ormallending to the food marketing sector: This research should concentrate on 
finding innovative lending practices that will reduce costs and risks to both 
lenders and borrowers. Ideally, it should involve traders, commercial lenders, 
government policy personnel, and legal experts. 
• Capturing economies of scale within food wholesaling and retailing: Building on 
the work into improved lending, this research should be broad-ranging and include 
investigation into capital, business skill, entrepreneurial, cultural, and 
infrastructural constraints. An understanding of the relevant constraints will allow 
policy makers to develop strategies to encourage larger scale wholesaling and 
retailing. 
• Improved market facility planning: If Kampala's urban authority is willing to co-
operate, we recommend assistance aimed at improving the planning of Kampala's 
markets, with the ultimate aim of reducing marketing costs, improving sanitation 
and reducing congestion in the city centre. The work should engage urban 
planners and traders in a collaborative approach. 
The final two recommendations apply specifically to technical innovation within 
cassava marketing systems. 
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• Drying technology: We do not recommend spending research funds on 
developing ways for drying cassava roots at the farm level. New drying 
techniques would only fmd relevance during the three months of the wet season. 
Furthermore, in order to find favour among farmers, drying innovations would 
have to satisfy the impossible combination of being non-labour and non-capital 
intensive. We do however recommend further research on the financial viability 
of drying innovations at the village assembler 1 evel of the marketing chain, where 
capital constraints are lower. Village assemblers handle greater volumes of chips 
and may therefore be ab le to exploit economies of scale in the drying process. 
• Fresh cassava storage: We recommend research into the feasibility of adapting 
CIATINRJ fresh cassava storage teclmology for use by Ugandan traders. Costs 
and benefits to the traders should form the central theme of the research. 
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1. Introduction 
One of the numerous difficulties we encountered during this research was reconciling 
the diverse objectives of the participating funding agencies and research 
organisations. DFID, represented both by its Ugandan bilateral aid section and by the 
Crop Post Harvest Programme, wished to know where to invest future cassava 
research and technical co-operation funds. By contrast, the futemational Institute of 
Tropical Agriculture (IITA) and the East African Research Network (EARNET) 
wished to use the research as a model for food marketing research throughout the 
region. Finally, Uganda's national research establishment wished to find markets for 
the excess cassava production caused as a side effect of the successful dissemination 
of new disease resistant cassava varieties. 
Meeting for the first time as the research team, we reflected that over-production is in 
reality a short-term imbalance that will be corrected by appropriate farmer supply 
responses. We therefore preferred to focus the research on ways in which the various 
cassava commodity systems can contribute to greater growth and development within 
Uganda. DFID's and liT A's objectives would be served in the process. 
Such a large area of research prompted early prioritisation of the work. We decided 
to split the research into two parts, one that would examine constraints and 
opportunities within traditional cassava marketing chains, and another that would 
investigate the potential for increasing the use of cassava based raw materials in 
Ugandan manufacturing industries. 
This report presents findings from our research into traditional cassava marketing. 
We opted to focus our efforts on types of cassava trade that enjoy the greatest 
concentration of marketing services. fuevitably, this meant looking most closely at 
rural to urban flows. We do not mean to dismiss the importance of rural to rural 
flows, but merely wish to point out that flows to urban areas are more complicated 
and dynamic, and therefore provide the opportunity for higher impact innovations. 
The choice of which cassava products to research was simple. By far the most 
valuable trade is in dried cassava and fresh cassava. Our research methodology 
combined a series of interviews ofkey marketing chain participants1 with analysis of 
secondary information, mostly price and consumption data. The research was 
conducted intermittently between November 1999 and February 2000. 
1 Fieldwork for this research was conducted in Hoima, lganga, Kampala, Kamuli, Lira, Masindi, Soroti, 
Kulu, Jinja, and Kaliro. In total, 16 travelling traders, 31 wholesalers and retailers, and 8 millers were 
interviewed. 
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2. The Marketing Environment 
This section provides background information on the policy, demographic and 
economic environments in which cassava trading operates. 
Demography 
Uganda's current estimated population is 22 million and is growing at approximately 
2.5% per annum. 16% ofthe population currently lives in urban areas. By 2010, this 
proportion is forecasted to rise to 22%. These figures underline the growing 
importance that food production and marketing have in feeding Uganda's population. 
Consumer Incomes 
Over the last ten years, per capita GDP measured in constant prices has risen by an 
average of 3.2 % per annum, suggesting that food demand has risen not only because 
of population increases but also through an income effect. Although we could fmd no 
information on changes in income distribution, anecdotal evidence suggests that there 
is a growing middle-class population in major cities such as Kampala. Though 
currently small, this group will become increasingly important as consumers of higher 
quality, higher value added food produce. 
Government policy 
In the first draft of the proposed government "Plan for the Modernisation of 
Agriculture" (PMA), the authors write: "Government is committed to ensuring that 
all commercial activities in agriculture such as production, processing, trading, 
supply of inputs, exports and imports are carried out entirely by the private sector. 
The government's role in these sub-sectors will continue to be mainly limited to 
setting policies, rules and regulations". The document also describes current and 
proposed schemes for improving public and private services to the agri-business 
sector, including investments in rural transport infrastructure, a rationalisation of rural 
lending and better contract enforcement legislation. The PMA clearly reflects the 
government's belief in the private sector's important role in liberalised marketing 
structures. 
Manufacturing industry 
In 1997, manufacturing industry contributed 9% to total GDP. Nine years previously 
it contributed just 5.4%. This small but growing manufacturing base will demand 
increasingly large quantities of raw materials. Most of this demand is currently 
satisfied by imports, which by comparison with local supplies, are cheap and reliably 
available. Nevertheless, the future may hold some promise for locally sourced raw 
materials, including those derived from cassava. 
Financial markets 
Farmers and small businesses are poorly served by formal lending institutions. Poor 
branch coverage in rural areas contributes to high lending costs and poor loan 
recovery rates. Even for larger businesses, borrowing is not a particularly attractive 
option. Real rates of interest are as high as 18%, while nominal rates are 
approximately 17% above the government's base lending rate. Government observers 
believe that these high rates are the result of inefficiency within the commercial 
banking sector and the high risk of loan default. 
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3. Cassava Flour 
3.1 Consumption and Prices 
Cassava flour is milled from sun-dried pieces of cassava root, usually referred to as 
chips. While fresh cassava perishes within five days, its flour can be stored for 
several months. It is usually consumed by mixing it in high proportions with millet 
flour (a relatively expensive product) to produce a more nutritious and tasty food 
staple. 
Table 1 and 2 give estimates of cassava flour consumption in 1997. The figures were 
derived from data collected during the 1996/97 Uganda Household Monitoring 
Survey. 
.bl 
------ -
R . 1 E . fC 1 c 99 
-- - o - - - ---- ------ ------ - - ------- -- ------ - - - - - -~s_. - - - -- -- -- - · 
Quantity Per-capita Quantity Per-capita 
purchased quantity consumed from consumption from 
(tonnes) purchased (kg) own production own production 
(tonnes) (kg) 
Central Region 14,700 2.55 7,500 1.31 
Eastern Region 34,000 6.61 45,900 8.93 
Western Region 17,500 3.09 26,900 4.77 
Northern region 21 ,900 5.64 11,200 2.88 
TOTAL 88,100 4.31 91,500 4.48 I 
Source: Author's estimates using data from 1996/97 Uganda National Household Survey. 
Table 2. Rural/Urban Esf fC Fl c 
----------- ------- · -- - - ---- ~--·---r ~- -- 1997 
Quantity Per-capita Consumption Per-capita 
purchased in 1997 quantity from own consumption from 
(tonnes) purchased in 1997 production in own production in 
(kg) 1997 (tonnes) 1997 (kg) 
Rural 75,200 4.38 90,600 5.28 
Urban 12,900 3.94 900 0.28 1 
-
Source: Author's estimates using data from 1996/97 Uganda National Household Survey. 
A warning must be attached to these estimates. The Ugandan Household Surveys use 
a recall period of seven days and interview each household just once. Furthermore, 
all interviews tend to occur within the same month. Estimating annual figures from 
such data therefore runs the risk of introducing bias due to seasonal variations in 
consumption. A second problem occurs because not all the units used in the surveys 
are standardised. This is more of a problem with fresh cassava data, for which 
consumption is usually recorded in heaps of unspecified weight. Heap weights vary 
between both regions and seasons. 
However, while the absolute values of estimates should be treated with a degree of 
caution, their relative sizes should still represent an accurate picture of comparative 
levels of consumption between regions and between rural and urban areas. 
Clearly, consumers in Central Region are on average the least fond of cassava flour, a 
finding easily explained by the region's traditional preference for matoke (a food 
staple prepared from bananas). However, urban areas within the region have seen 
significant immigration from the war-affected Northern Region, where cassava 
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consumption is more common. Consequently, consumption in Central Region has 
almost certainly increased over the last decade and may still be rising. 
Eastern Region's preference for cassava is evident. While cassava is often seen as a 
food-security crop in Central and Western Regions, it is an important part of Eastern 
consumers' regular diet. The same is true ofNorthern diets, although the Region's 
figure for "per-capita consumption from own production" gives the impression that 
this may not be true, particularly in view of cassava's ability to thrive in the generally 
less fertile soils of the north. An explanation may be the riskiness of producing one's 
own food in an area where rebel raids on villages often target food. If this explanation 
is valid, it highlights the important role that food trade has played in maintaining a 
degree of food security in the Region (note the high level of per capita cassava flour 
purchases). 
Table 2 reveals that per capita consumption of cassava flour is more important in rural 
than in urban areas, a reflection, no doubt, ofthe greater choice of foods available in 
most towns. This does not indicate that cassava flour plays an insignificant role in 
urban diets. When measured on a calorific basis, it is among the cheapest 
carbohydrate sources, and therefore helps poor urban residents to eke out their food 
budgets. As a consequence, wealthier urban consumers often regard cassava flour as 
a poor person's food, and prefer more expensive staples such as maize flour and rice. 
Cassava flour consumers generally prefer a white, non-odorous product that is 
produced from well-dried cassava pieces. Some preference exists for yellow-brown 
flour produced from fermented cassava pieces, although both this type of flour and 
off-white flour milled from mouldy cassava pieces trade at a 20 to 25% discount 
compared with the white variety. 
Figure 1 shows selected real (adjusted for inflation) retail food prices for Kampala 
between September 1989 and January 2000 (data source: Bureau of Statistics). The 
middle price series is for cassava flour. Two comparisons are worth drawing with the 
other series for matoke and millet flour. Firstly, cassava flour prices have been more 
susceptible to price shocks. The two obvious price spikes, the first in 92/93 and the 
second in 97/98, were both caused by a combination ofthe cassava mosaic virus and 
abnormal weather conditions. The second notable comparison is that while matoke 
and millet flour prices (and indeed most other major food staple prices) showed no 
significant real long term trend over the ten year period, cassava flour prices have 
increased (the trend is statistically significant at the 5% level: t = 4.48). A plausible 
explanation for this positive trend is the effect that refugees from the north have had 
on food demand in Kampala. As impoverished northemers have arrived in the capital, 
demand for cassava flour has almost certainly increased. If supply has not kept pace, 
prices would have inevitably risen. 
Whatever the cause of the trend, there must be considerable concern over food-
security in Kampala. Given that cassava flour prices are not only increasing in the 
long term but are also volatile, Kampala's poor consumers are in a particularly 
vulnerable position. 
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Figure 2 shows seasonal retail price movements for cassava flour in Kampala. The 
grand seasonal index (GSI) displayed on the graph was computed from data gathered 
by the Ugandan Bureau of Statistics. GSis show seasonal patterns that remain once 
random, cyclical and trend elements have been removed from price series (details of 
the calculation appear in appendix A). Unfortunately for our purposes, the Bureau of 
Statistics only collects cassava flour retail price data for Kampala, Mbarara and Gulu. 
Of these, only Kampala is a major consumer market. The applicability of the results 
to other parts of Uganda is therefore in question. 
The GSI methodology permits statistical testing of the existence of seasonal price 
movements. In our case, the tests failed to prove that the GSI for cassava flour in 
Kampala varies significantly from its mean value. However, given that statistical 
testing is notoriously conservative, and that the pattern in Figure 2 lends itself to 
plausible explanation, the following observations are worth making: 
1. Prices decline between January and March. This periods corresponds with the dry 
season, when sun-drying conditions are optimal. Volumes of good quality dried 
cassava chips reaching the market are correspondingly high, leading to decreasing 
pnces. 
2. Between March and June, prices rise. Rains in many parts of the country start in 
March and continue until May/June. Not only is effective sun-drying particularly 
difficult and labour intensive during this period, but farmers, the principal dryers 
of cassava, exploit the rains for planting, thereby creating a labour scarcity for 
non-agricultural activities. The combination of these factors causes a market 
shortage of good quality cassava flour and drives prices upwards. 
3. Prices decline again between June until October. The return of better sun-drying 
conditions in June co-incides with the major harvest periods for maize and millet. 
Unlike cassava, which can be harvested throughout the year, maize and millet are 
seasonal crops, and, in the absence of widespread inter-seasonal storage, their 
prices during and soon after harvest are considerably lower than at other times of 
the year. As preferred food staples for many consumers, maize and millet are 
substituted into diets at the expense of cassava flour. 
The issue of substitutability is worth further consideration. As already noted, matoke 
is the preferred food staple in the Western and Central Regions, whose combined 
populations constitute well over half of Uganda's total population. Considerable 
concern exists over declining banana yields caused by soil degradation in these 
regions. Although evidence from Figure 1 does not support the notion that matoke 
prices have subsequently increased, there is an expectation that they might in the 
future. Putting aside the possibility that higher banana prices would trigger greater 
fertiliser usage (from near-zero current levels), there remains the prospect that cassava 
flour might substitute matoke in many peoples' diets. However, consumer 
perceptions usually have very strong m omenta, and cassava flour's low status as a 
food-security staple is therefore unlikely to change quickly. In the near future, any 
substitution that arises through declining banana yields in Central and Eastern 
Regions is likely to favour higher status food staples such as sweet potato. 
Long term cassava flour consumption trends are difficult to predict. The return of 
peace and therefore of some degree of prosperity in the north and other war affected 
parts of the country would no doubt increase demand. Population increases will also 
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have a positive effect. However, as real consumer incomes rise, expenditure on 
inferior goods, of which cassava flour is almost certainly one, will decline. The long 
term future of cassava flour consumption is therefore unclear. In the medium term 
however, cassava flour will remain an important food staple. 
3.2 Description of Trading. 
The main dried cassava supply areas to Kampala are Apac in the north, and Kumi, 
Soroti and Pallisa in the east. Although Hoima in the west supplies lower volumes, 
quality is generally higher, thereby giving traders who source their cassava from 
Hoima an instant advantage in price negotiations with their buyers. Other supply 
areas become important in the wet season. Chips from Paidha in north west Uganda, 
although too distant from Kampala to be competitive during the dry season, start to 
arrive during the wet season due to the general scarcity of dried cassava. Imports 
from the Democratic Republic of Congo and Tanzania also reach the Kampala 
markets during this period. 
Figure 3 reveals the complexity of dried cassava marketing2 . The number of links in 
the chain reflects the many services that are required to deliver cassava flour to 
consumers. From harvest to purchase at the local store, cassava must be, dried, 
bulked (in other words, assembled into tradable quantities), transported, stored, milled 
and finally retailed at convenient locations for consumers. The roles of each 
marketing chain participant, and a description of their relationships and transactions 
with other participants is given below. 
Farmers 
Farmers harvest, peel and dry cassava roots. They have several marketing options. 
Using their own transport they can sell directly to rural retailers, rural consumers or, if 
they are near major district level towns, to wholesalers. Alternatively they can sell to 
travelling traders (who provide links with major consumer markets) or village 
assemblers. Farmers rarely extend credit to their customers, and will only do so for 
traders with whom they have built a long-standing trading relationship. 
Village assemblers 
These individuals typically have access to more capital than their village neighbours. 
They use these financial resources and their local knowledge to bulk cassava chips 
from the surrounding area. Customers are willing to pay for this service because they 
would otherwise have to spend time and money assembling sufficient quantities of 
cassava chips to justify the cost of transport to the next stage in the marketing chain. 
The village assemblers also relieve their customers of the burden of quality 
controlling the small quantities of chips typically offered by farmers. To some extent, 
the assemblers also sort chips into a high quality white, well dried grade chips and a 
lower quality discoloured grade, sifting for extraneous matter in the process. Buyers 
often place orders with trusted village assemblers. Once the required quantities have 
been gathered, the assemblers contact the buyers, who invariably arrange their own 
transport. The assemblers often receive cash advances to 
2 The information used to construct the diagram was gathered through fieldwork in 10 districts 
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Figure 3. The Dried Cassava Trading Chain 
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fund their activities. Their customers are usually wholesalers from local towns or 
travelling traders. 
District level wholesalers 
These traders, who operate in district level towns, serve retailers in their local area 
and to a limited extent also supply chips and flour to wholesalers in major consumer 
markets in cities such as Kampala and Jinja. Their primary roles are to arrange the 
transformation of chips into flour (usually using the services of specialised millers), 
and to store the flour in volumes sufficient to enable their customers to purchase their 
requirements in a timely fashion. In a lesser role, district level wholesalers provide 
another level of bulking between the farmer and the major consumer markets. 
Speculative storage to benefit from inter-seasonal price movements is rarely practised 
because of poor liquidity and high riskiness (these constraints are examined in more 
detail in section 3.5). 
Few district level wholesalers are specialised in dried cassava. Typically they deal in 
at least two other food products, commonly maize and millet. The more progressive 
wholesalers concentrate on cassava chips and flour in the wet season, when sourcing 
quality chips is a problem yet profits are highest. The less ambitious traders sell more 
cassava flour during the dry season, when supplies are abundant. 
Few wholesalers secure credit from their sellers, yet many feel compelled to offer 
credit to their buyers in order to maintain regular custom. 
When selling to wholesalers in larger towns, the district level wholesalers rely on 
customers to arrange collection of the flour. Travelling traders also provide a link 
between small and large towns. 
Travelling traders 
These traders supply the majority of cassava flour to large urban consumer markets. 
They turn over their capital rapidly by minimising the length of time between 
purchase and sale. By avoiding storage, they both limit the risk that prices will move 
against them and avoid significant overhead costs. Most commonly, such traders buy 
from several village assemblers in one trip, and hire vehicles to transport the chips to 
the urban centres, where they pay for milling and sell flour to wholesalers. Travelling 
traders tend to specialise in just one food product. 
Urban wholesalers 
Urban wholesalers share most of the characteristics oftheir district level counterparts. 
The major differences are location and scale. The former distinction is obvious, yet it 
is the urban wholesalers' location within major markets that allow them to operate on 
a larger scale. Whereas district level wholesalers may trade between five and fifteen 
1 OOkg sacks of cassava flour in one week, urban wholesalers commonly sell between 
fifty and one hundred sacks. 
Miller/Wholesalers 
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A number of specialist businesses in major towns like Jinja, Lira and Kampala 
combine cassava flour milling with wholesaling. These efficiently run operations 
purchase either directly from village assemblers via agents or from travelling traders. 
Their average weekly turnover is usually in the range of 10 to 15 tonnes and milling 
losses reportedly amount to no more than 2%. 
Service millers 
Such businesses do not engage in trade but merely provide milling services. In rural 
areas and the smaller district towns, millers often use small petrol or diesel powered 
mills, and do not specialise in milling any one commodity. In large towns, millers are 
often specialised and run electrically powered mills. 
Urban Retailers 
The majority of food retailing in urban areas is characterised by a large number of 
small, non-specialised stores, which sell small quantities of numerous products, often 
trading food alongside manufactured goods such as pens and razor blades. 
3.3. Dried Cassava Marketing Efficiency 
In a recent concept paper published as part ofFAO's "Food into Cities" Collection, 
Gideon Onumah and Michael Hub bard sensibly point out that: 
"[In developing countries,] Food marketing chains to cities do not perform efficiently 
the basic marketing functions of collection (i.e., bulking of produce from farmers), 
handling, transporting, storage, processing, wholesaling and retailing. The result is: 
• Wider seasonal variation in supplies and prices than is necessary; 
• Urban consumers pay relatively more for food while producer prices remain low, 
thus discouraging farmers from increasing output; 
• Health and environmental risks due to food product contamination, traffic and 
market waste." (Onumah and Hubbard 1999) 
To this list, we could usefully add two more points. Firstly, poor marketing efficiency 
worsens food insecurity in times of food shortage. This is true both in urban and rural 
areas. Secondly, improved marketing efficiency allows trading networks to extend 
into remote and therefore marginalised production areas. 
Marketing efficiency can be measured in several ways. For the purposes ofthis 
report, we have concentrated on the following: 
• Spatial Integration. Do prices in different towns move in sympathy with each 
other? A well integrated national food marketing system leads to efficient 
distribution which responds to demand. Good spatial integration relies both on 
good physical communications between markets and good information flows on 
prices and market conditions 
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• Information flow. Is sufficient and appropriate market information available to all 
participants in the marketing chain? Are participants able to make appropriate use 
ofthe information? 
• Innovation. Do participants innovate in order to minimise costs (including those 
associated with risk), increase productivity, improve quality and supply new or 
under-exploited markets? 
• Scale of operation. Do participants operate on a scale that allows them to 
minimise costs? In other words, do farmers, traders and processors exploit 
economies of scale? 
• Competitiveness. Does the appropriate level of competition exist in order to 
promote cost minimisation and innovation? Too much competition (usually 
termed "atomistic competition") can be just as inefficient as too little competition. 
• Costs and margins. Properly interpreted, costs and margins reveal information on 
marketing inefficiency, excess profits and constraints within the marketing chain. 
This section ofthe report examines the efficiency ofUganda's dried cassava 
marketing chain using these indicators as sub-headings. 
Spatial Integration 
Correlation coefficients provide a simple measure of how two variables move in 
sympathy with each other. Table 3 provides correlation coefficients for cassava flour 
prices in nine Ugandan towns3. Each town's price movements are compared with 
movements in the eight other towns (values close to 1 indicate high correlation, while 
those close to 0 indicate no correlation). Following the somewhat arbitrary 
conventional practice, coefficients of over 0.8 (bold in Table 3) are regarded as 
exhibiting high correlation, while coefficients between 0.6 and 0.8 (italics in Table 3) 
are said to show moderate levels of correlation. 
Table 3. Correlation Coefficients for Cassava Flour Prices in Nine Towns 
Kampala Kumi Lira Soroti Masindi Kamuli Jinja Apach Luwero 
Kampala 1.00 0.69 0.57 0.57 0.53 0.74 0.58 0.75 0.66 
Kumi 1.00 0.73 0.79 0.76 0.81 0.81 0.72 0.77 
Lira 1.00 0.69 0.48 0.75 0.63 0.60 0.71 
Soroti 1.00 0.68 0.76 0.66 0.74 0.58 
Masindi 1.00 0.49 0.56 0.52 0.58 
Kamuli 1.00 0.82 0.84 0.58 
Jinja 1.00 0.59 0.59 
Apach 1.00 0.52 
Luwero 1.00 
3 Although criticism has been levelled at the use of correlation coefficients for measuring the extent to 
which two markets are integrated, none of the criticism is so serious that careful interpretation is 
incapable of avoiding the pitfalls (Trotter 1992). The most significant criticism is that a high 
correlation coefficient may give the impression that two markets are well integrated, when in fact there 
is no physical flow of produce between them. In this case, the interpretation is that the two markets 
respond to prices in a third location, usually a major consumer market. 
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The coefficients were calculated using monthly cassava flour retail prices gathered by 
IITA and the Ugandan Bureau of Statistics between January 1998 and September 
1999. The prices were deflated using the national CPl. 
Kampala's correlation coefficients with other towns are disappointingly low. This is 
probably caused by data deficiencies. During its data gathering exercise, IITA did not 
collect prices in Kampala. To compensate for this, we included Kampala price data 
gathered by the Bureau of Statistics (the Bureau has consistently collected cassava 
flour data in just two towns, Kampala and Mbarara). The methodologies that the two 
organisations use for gathering_ price data are quite different and consequently the 
price series are not directly comparable. Despite this, the Bureau's Kampala prices 
show moderate correlation with liT A prices in Kumi, Kamuli, Luwero and Apach, 
towns located in areas that supply large quantities of dried cassava to Kampala. 
Kumi is either moderately or highly correlated with all other towns, a finding that 
underlines Kumi District's importance as a major dried cassava supplier. While its 
trade in dried cassava may not be physically integrated with trade in all of the other 
towns, the high degrees of correlation in such cases are probably the result of response 
to prices in third towns, most likely Kampala and Jinja, which both have large 
consumer demand. 
In summary, although our analysis reveals moderate to strong market integration 
between many towns, there is clearly room for improvement. Greater integration will 
help to reduce both the absolute level of consumer prices and their volatility. Farmers 
would gain through increased marketing opportunities. 
Information Flow 
Given that there is currently little formal dissemination of market information in 
Uganda, we were unsurprised to fmd that farmers and traders receive information 
either first hand or by talking to other participants in the marketing chain. As 
expected, those traders who provide links between towns have access to the best 
information. A worrying consequence of the generally poor flow of information is 
distrust. Price negotiations, particularly between individuals who have not built long-
standing trading relationships, can take up to one hour to conclude. This is almost 
always because the seller, in the absence of up-to-date information, fears being 
cheated by the buyer. The consequence is that transaction costs are higher than they 
need to be. Farmers generally have the poorest access to information. 
Innovation 
There is very little innovation within the dried cassava marketing chain. Few 
participants seek technical and market information that would allow them to reduce 
costs, increase profitability and exploit new market opportunities (such as those 
potentially offered in neighbouring countries). If entrepreneurship does exist within 
the chain, it is almost certainly stifled by low levels of liquidity, expensive transport 
and poor information flows. 
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Scale of operation 
Of the participants interviewed for this research, only the larger wholesalers, 
travelling traders, and miller/wholesalers could be said to exploit economies of scale. 
All other groups, particularly farmers and retailers, operate on such a small scale and 
with such a lack of specialisation, that costs are much higher than necessary. 
However, scale and specialisation are subject to constraints, of which low liquidity 
and high risk are the most significant. Low levels of managerial and business skill 
may also be relevant. 
Competitiveness 
Too little competition within dried cassava marketing is certainly not a problem; 
many people compete with each other at every stage of the chain. However, 
observation during fieldwork suggested that there may be too much competition, 
particularly at the retail level, where net incomes are so severely squeezed that no 
funds are available for expanding the scale of business and thereby improving cost 
efficiency and profitability. More evidence on this is revealed in the next section. 
3.4 Costs and Margins 
Table 4 gives an example of costs and margins in dried cassava trading between rural 
and urban areas. It summarises a chain that starts with a farmer selling cassava chips 
to a village assembler. A travelling trader collects the chips from the assembler, 
arranges transport to the urban market, contracts a miller to transform the chips into 
flour, and sells the flour to an urban wholesaler, who stores it for an average of two 
weeks. Retailers then buy from the wholesaler and sell to the public. While this 
chain is not the only way dried cassava is traded, it describes what we believe is 
common practice for rural to urban trade. Variations on this chain still encounter the 
same costs, although to whom they fall and what margins such people enjoy, depends 
very much on the exact trading arrangement. 
The cost and price information used to construct Table 4 were gathered during 
fieldwork conducted in February 2000. Consequently, Table 4 provides a snap-shot 
of trading during the dry season. The situation during the wet season is somewhat 
different because, as mentioned before, a general scarcity of chips drives prices 
upwards. Evidence from the GSI calculations suggests that retail prices in Kampala 
rise by an average of 8.4% between March and June. By contrast, most traders 
interviewed for this research claimed that prices rise by between ten and fifteen 
percent. Whichever is correct4, it appears that prices in the wet season do not rise 
uniformly throughout the chain. Most traders claim that flour is more profitable per 
kilogram during the wet season, suggesting that gross margins increase during this 
high price period. 
4 The difference is probably connected with quality. During the wet season, flour quality generally 
deteriorates. Consequently the quality of the flour sampled by Bureau of Statistics personnel during the 
dry season is higher than that of the flour sampled in the wet season. In effect, Bureau staff measure 
the prices of different grades of product in the two seasons (giving rise to an understated rise in the 
GSI). By contrast, traders almost certainly measure the rise in prices using consistent grades of flour. 
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Table 4. Dried Cassava Trading Costs and Margins 
Ush/1 OOkg %of selling price 
Farmer 
Selling Erice 10000 
Village assembler 
Purchase price 10000 
Selling price 12000 
Gross margin 2000 16.7% 
Costs 
Transport 1176 
Net margin &24 6.9% 
Travelli.ng trader 
Purchase price• 12245 
Selling price• 20000 
Gross margin 7755 38.8% 
Costs 
Miscellaneous labour 700 
Transport 3529 
Milling 1000 
Packaging 500 
District levy ("loading fee") 200 
Market levy 500 
TOTAL COSTS 6429 
Net margin .. 1326 6.6% 
Urban Wholesaler 
Purchase price• 20000 
Selling price• 22000 
Gross margin 2000 9.1% 
Costs 
Overheads 250 
Capital 150 
TOTAL COSTS 400 
Net margin•• 1600 8.0% 
Urban Retailer 
Purchase price• 22000 
Selling price• 30000 
Gross margin 8000 26.7% 
Costs 
Overhead 4875 
Variable 300 
TOTAL COSTS 5175 
Net margin•• 2825 9.4% 
• Equivalent flour price after adjusting for 2% milling 
losses 
•• Before income tax and payment of trading licence 
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Seasons aside, there are a few points worth making about Table 4. All traders in the 
chain appear to earn similar net margins. However overall net incomes vary 
significantly between different types of trader. Travelling traders' and urban 
wholesalers' turnovers are much higher than those of either village assemblers or 
retailers. For example, a travelling trader may trade 100 bags a week, needing one 
trip to source this quantity. His weekly net income would be approximately 130,000 
USh. By contrast, a retailer may sell only one bag a week, making less than 3,000 
USh. Naturally, the retailer will profit on limited sales of many other items, but the 
size of the difference in respective net incomes is clear. 
Turning the focus to gross margins (the difference between purchase and selling 
price), travelling traders and retailers appear to benefit the most. However, their high 
margins are matched by high costs. In the case of the travelling trader, all costs are 
variable (i.e. they are proportional to the amount of flour traded). While some ofthe 
costs appear high, an increase in scale of trade is unlikely to reduce costs per kilogram 
significantll. By contrast, the largest proportion of retailers' costs are overheads 
(mostly store rental), with the consequence that an increase in retailers' volume of 
trade will bring down the retail cost of trading flour. Given that retailers add 
approximately 36% to the price of flour in between buying and selling it, a reduction 
in this margin through increased cost efficiency will benefit consumers considerably. 
Retailers are of course constrained by lack of capital and probably also by poor 
business skills and risk averseness. Innovative solutions to these constraints will have 
to be found if consumers and entrepreneurial retailers are to benefit from retail 
economies of scale. 
Similar arguments can be made for wholesaling, although the scope for exploiting 
economies of scale is more limited. Larger warehouses would however bring down 
overhead costs of storage. 
In conclusion, the figures in Table 4 reveal a situation where no one is making 
excessive profits from trading dried cassava but where significant cost efficiencies 
could be realised. 
3.5 Inter-Seasonal Storage 
During our fieldwork, several wholesalers claimed that they deliberately hold stocks 
in order to take advantage of inter-seasonal price movements. Others claimed that 
they would engage in this kind of storage if they had sufficient capital. 
Figure 4 is basically the same graph as Figure 2, except that the GSI of Kampala retail 
prices is joined by 95% confidence intervals (the upper and lower lines). Strictly 
speaking, the intervals should be interpreted as meaning that we are 95% confident 
that the actual value of each month's GSI lies between the upper and lower limits set 
by the interval. Another interpretation is that the intervals, widely spaced as they are, 
give an indication of the unpredictable nature of seasonal dried cassava prices 
5 Economies of scale could probably be realised through the use of larger capacity vehicles, although 
the scope for this must surely be limited. 
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movements. This uncertainty leads to risk for any trader who is holding speculative 
stocks. 
Setting aside the problems of risk and insufficient capital, on average, would storing 
between seasons be profitable? The answer, from the ballpark figures that we have 
gathered, appears to be an emphatic no. 
The maximum seasonal price increase according to our GSI calculations is 8.4% for 
the period between March and June6. As indicated in footnote 3, this is probably an 
understatement of the true seasonal price increase. By contrast to our GSI figure, 
traders reported seasonal increases in the order of 10 to 15%. Given the 
unpredictability of seasonal price movements, a 10% rise over three months is 
probably a reasonably safe figure. 
If a wholesaler purchases a 1 OOkg bag of flour for 20,000 USh in March, he could 
reasonably expect to sell it three months later for 22,000 USh. His costs are related to 
working capital and physical storage. The real cost of capital in Uganda is estimated 
at approximately 1.5% per month, which compounded over three months is 
approximately 4.6%. The cost of tying up the trader's capital for the storage period is 
therefore 4.6% of 20,000 = 920 USh. The physical cost of storing a bag for three 
months is approximately another 3,000 USh, making a total carry cost of3,920 USh. 
The trader could therefore expect to lose 1,920 US h. In fact, on the basis of these 
rough figures, the trader would not profit unless the three month price rise reached 
20%. 
6 In the absence of a sufficiently long wholesale price series, we have had to make the assumption that 
retail price movements, as displayed in figure X, mirror wholesale price movements. This is probably 
a realistic assumption, given that correlation coefficients of retail and wholesale prices in the short 
period for which we have data, lie between 0.76 and 0.94 for several different locations. 
20 
3.6 Market Facilities 
A common feature ofUgandan cassava flour wholesale markets is that they are in the 
centre of towns and often compete for space with other activities such as food 
retailing. Limited space leads to high rents and few opportunities for individuals to 
expand their wholesale businesses. Sanitary conditions are far from optimal due to 
the inadequate provision of public utilities. Furthermore, the regular flow of delivery 
trucks creates additional congestion and pollution. These conditions apply not only to 
the cassava flour trade but equally to wholesale markets for all types of domestically 
produced food crops. 
There is a clear need for better planned wholesale markets, placed in areas where 
conflicting land uses are minimal. The new markets should provide affordable 
facilities that will optimise the efficiency of food delivery and storage, while 
maintaining good sanitary conditions and easy access for retailers. The development 
of such markets can only be achieved by close consultation between urban authorities 
and traders (Onumah and Hubbard 1999). 
3. 7 Cassava Flour Quality 
As a general rule, poor flour quality is not a problem during the dry season. Sun-
drying conditions are optimal for producing a grade of white, dry flour that consumers 
can afford. Urban manufacturers of pancakes often require a premium grade of flour, 
which has no discolouration or odour. Such demand is supplied on special order by 
urban wholesalers, who employ labour to scrub cassava chips and then sun-dry them. 
The flour milled from these chips commands a premium of up to 100 USh per kg over 
standard flour, although overall demand is limited. 
Flour quality declines significantly during the wet season, which, in combination with 
a general scarcity of chips of all grades, leads to the higher wet season prices 
discussed previously in this report. In theory, significant benefits could be derived 
from a technology that could dry cassava effectively during the wet. Farmers (the 
principal dryers of cassava) would gain more income, urban consumer prices would 
be lower in the wet season and national food security would improve. In practice 
however, an appropriate technology may prove elusive. Drying would have to be 
non-capital intensive because farmers have little cash, and would also have to be non-
labour intensive because farmers are busy in the wet season with other activities, 
principally planting. These constraints would provide a major challenge to 
technologists. 
An alternative approach may be to encourage drying innovation among village 
assemblers. Capital is less of a constraint at this level of the trading chain and the 
higher volumes of chips that assemblers handle would help to bring down drying 
costs. The profitability of this activity should of course be assessed before any moves 
towards technology adaptation and promotion are made. 
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4. Fresh Cassava 
4.1 Consumption and Prices 
This section of the report concentrates on the flow of fresh cassava between rural 
supply areas and major consumption markets, principally in Kampala. This flow is 
particularly dynamic andjnvolves a heavy concentration of marketing services. Rural 
to rural flows are, by comparison, much more diffuse. 
Unfortunately for our purposes, the data source that yielded consumption data for 
dried cassava can not be used to provide a similar insight to fresh cassava 
consumption. While the source (the 96/87 Ugandan Household Survey) records fresh 
cassava purchases and consumption from own production, it uses heaps of unspecified 
weight as the most common unit of measurement. Heaps vary in size between urban 
and rural areas, and also according to region and season. We could find no credible 
conversion factors to transform heaps into weights 7, and therefore are unable to 
provide fresh cassava consumption figures. 
Our fieldwork among fresh cassava traders revealed that urban consumers tend to 
prefer sweet flavoured, medium sized cassava roots. Many of the new mosaic disease 
resistant varieties are reportedly unpopular due to their bitter taste. From the traders 
point of view, roots that perish least quickly are preferable. Several traders expressed 
preference for roots with an outer bark-like skin that peels away easily to reveal a 
thick, often reddish, inner skin. 
We could find no evidence of retail price seasonality. Figure 5 shows the GSI of fresh 
cassava retail prices in Kampala. The upper and lower lines give the 95% confidence 
interval. Under testing, seasonality is rejected for all months. The same result is 
returned for Jinja, Mbale and Massaka. Supporting evidence for these findings came 
from interviews with several fresh cassava retailers in Kampala, who note no 
seasonality in demand from their customers. 
By contrast, supply does vary seasonally. Harvesting during the dry season is 
particularly labour intensive and often results in broken roots. No such problems exist 
in the wet season, and consequently supply tends to be higher. 
Figure 6 shows real fresh prices between September 1989 and January 2000. There is 
clearly a positive long term price trend (statistically significant at the 5% level: t = 
4.66). We can not provide a defmitive reason for this, although increased demand 
caused by urbanisation is almost certainly a factor. Perhaps more importantly, 
anecdotal evidence gathered from traders suggests that reserves of fresh cassava 
cultivated nearest to Kampala have been over-exploited. Supplies are now 
7 We rejected data from Kayiso (1993) as implausible. 
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Figure 5. Fresh Cassava Retail Price GSI for Kampala 
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sourced from further afield, thereby adding to transport costs and hence the retail 
price of fresh cassava. 
4.2 Description of Trading 
Fresh cassava trading is dynamic and highly streamlined by comparison with dried 
cassava trading. It is driven by the perishability of cassava roots, which necessitates 
swift movement from the farm to the consumer, with a minimal number of 
transactions. Traders are forced to discount their prices heavily if the cassava reaches 
the market two to three days after harvest. After five days, the roots are unsaleable. 
Figure 7 indicates the simplicity of the trading chain. The role of farmers is restricted 
to growing the cassava and negotiating a price either with travelling traders or their 
agents. If travelling traders use local agents, they contact them before arriving and 
give instructions to find suitable supplies of cassava. Local agents merely provide a 
service and at no point do they take possession ofthe cassava. Once contacted with 
news that their agents have complied with their instructions, the travelling traders hire 
transport, often from Kampala or the other major consumer towns, and travel to the 
farms. Once there, the traders hire labour to harvest and load the cassava on to the 
hired truck. Many traders follow traditional practices by negotiating to buy whole 
gardens before the cassava has been up-rooted. Despite sampling for yield, traders 
clearly take a considerable risk that the number and size of harvested tubers will be 
smaller than expected when the original price was struck. More progressive traders 
have adopted the practice of agreeing a price once the roots have been harvested. 
Roots are either loaded loosely onto the trucks, or in some cases, medium sized roots 
(the most marketable size) are bagged before loading. After payment of a local levy, 
the traders travel with the cassava to the urban market, usually preferring to travel at 
night to avoid police road-blocks. Police routinely stop trucks on the reasonable 
excuse that they are over-loaded. While this is invariably true, payment of a bribe is 
usually sufficient to convince policemen to allow the truck to pass. 
Traders arrive at the Kampala markets as early as 2am, at which time a crowd of 
retailers has already gathered. (The fact that traders and retailers are willing to keep 
such inconvenient hours is perhaps an indication ofthe profitability of fresh cassava 
trading). Travelling traders usually hand responsibility for selling the cassava to 
commission agents, who, in return for a fee, use their knowledge of local market 
conditions to negotiate sales to retailers. The latter sell to the public either within the 
confines of the market in which the cassava has arrived, or transport the roots to 
outlets scattered throughout the city. 
Fresh cassava prices vary on a daily basis. While demand is usually constant, the 
arrival of a large number of travelling traders in a particular Kampala market can 
drive down prices. Conversely, a lower than average number of travelling traders will 
cause prices to rise. This daily variation creates price risk for traders, who can not 
predict market prices when they negotiate purchase prices with farmers. Another 
problem that unpredictable market conditions create for travelling traders is 
uncertainty over the ability to sell before the cassava spoils. If many traders arrive at 
a market, several will be obliged to find alternative markets within Kampala. This 
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increases both the cost of transport and the possibility that the trader will be forced to 
discount his sales due to root deterioration. 
The areas that supply the majority ofKampala' s fresh cassava are Hoima in the west, 
Lira and Apac in the north, and Soroti and Pallisa in the east. 
Figure 7. The Fresh Cassava Trading Chain 
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4.3 Fresh Cassava Marketing Efficiency 
Spatial Integration 
Table 5 gives correlation coefficients between real fresh cassava retail price series in 
Kampala, Jinja, Mbale and Masaka. All but two of the coefficients show moderate 
integration between the towns. However, given the perishability of cassava roots, in 
reality we would not expect these markets (or any others) to be physically integrated. 
Instead, the moderate degrees of correlation shown in Table 5 are more likely to 
indicate that towns experience similar supply and demand patterns. 
Table 5. Correlation Coefficients between Real Retail 
Fresh Cassava Prices in Four Ugandan Towns 
Kampala Jinja Mbale M as aka 
Kampala 1 0.78 0.65 0.72 
Jinja 1 0.68 0.57 
Mbale 1 0.50 
Masaka 1 
Source: Author's calculations using CPI data 
Information Flows 
Of all the fresh cassava marketing chain participants, farmers possess the least up-to-
date market information. Thus disadvantaged, farmers often prolong price 
negotiations with traders in an attempt to avoid being cheated. 
Travelling traders lack sufficient information on daily market conditions and therefore 
rely on commission agents to transact deals for them. Given the prevailing volatility 
of daily prices and the swiftness of the trade, delivering relevant and timely 
information to traders would be virtually impossible. 
Innovation 
During our fieldwork, we unearthed evidence that travelling traders who regularly 
supply Kampala's Kasubi market co-operate to regulate the supply of fresh cassava. 
This is not to say that they artificially restrict supply8, but merely agree to space their 
arrivals in the market evenly throughout the week, thereby avoiding volatile daily 
prices. The co-operation also extends to the creation of an informal revolving credit 
fund, which traders contribute to and then utilise on a rotating basis. These examples 
of innovation within the fresh cassava marketing underline the dynamism ofthe 
system. Similar innovation is conspicuous by its absence in the dried cassava 
marketing chain. 
Scale of Operation 
As well as being limited by poor liquidity, the scale on which fresh cassava is 
marketed is also limited by perishability. Traders have a severely restricted period in 
8 If they did, buyers would simply go to other markets within Kampala. 
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which to assemble fresh cassava and transport it to market before their investment 
starts to lose value. 
Competitiveness 
The fresh cassava trade appears to be sufficiently lucrative that it attracts a large 
number of participants. In fact, it appears to be in a happy state where there is neither 
too much nor too little competition. More evidence is presented on this in the section 
below on costs and margins. 
4.4 Costs and Margins 
Table 6. Costs and Margins within the Fresh Cassava Trading Chain 
Farmer 
Selling price 
Travelling trader 
Purchase price* 
Selling price* 
Gross margin 
Costs 
Miscellaneous labour 
Transport 
Packaging material 
District levy ("loading fee") 
Police roadblocks 
Market levy 
Commission agent fee 
TOTAL COSTS 
Net margin** 
Urban Retailer 
Purchase price* 
Selling price* 
Gross margin 
USh/Bag 
6000 
6000 
20000 
14000 
2500 
7500 
500 
250 
300 
500 
700 
12250 
1750 
20000 
24000 
4000 
** Before income tax and payment of trading licence 
% of selling price 
70.0% 
8.8% 
16.7% 
Table 6 was constructed using data collected during fieldwork and assumptions that 
appear in appendix 2. It is designed to be representative of fresh cassava trading 
between rural areas and Kampala throughout the year. The only variables that change 
according to season are the farmgate buying price and the cost of harvesting, both of 
which are higher in the dry season. We have included average annual values in the 
table. 
Table 6 reveals no evidence that excessive profits are being earned by participants in 
the trading chain. Although travelling traders enjoy a large gross margin, once their 
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costs have been deducted, profitability is quite modest. Furthermore, their net returns 
should be seen in the context ofthe risk such they take, both in terms of uncertain 
market prices (which on a daily basis can vary by as much as the trader's net margin) 
and perishability. On average though, assuming that the traders sell between thirty 
and sixty bags per week, their net incomes are reasonably high by Ugandan standards. 
We did not have an opportunity to measure retailing costs during our fieldwork. 
However, given the unsophisticated nature of fresh cassava retailing, the single largest 
costs are likely to be transport from the market to the retail outlet, and the rent on the 
outlet itself. While this means that net margins are probably relatively large, the very 
small volumes that retailers sell severely limit overall net income. As with cassava 
flour retailing, lack of scale appears to be a major cause of inefficiency at the fresh 
cassava retailing level. 
4.5 Market Facilities 
The small trucks and pick-ups that bring fresh cassava to Kampala's markets arrive 
and park in open spaces within the market boundaries. Selling is conducted in a 
confused and crowded environment. Traders often complain of theft and ofbeing 
cheated by the commission agents. Conditions at Kasubi market are somewhat better 
and it has become popular among many travelling traders. It is located on the 
outskirts of Kampala, and therefore attracts fewer "hangers-on". Theft is reportedly 
much less common, and long-standing relationships between travelling traders and 
their commission agents have helped to build an atmosphere of trust. The example of 
Kasubi points the way for future development of fresh cassava markets. 
4.6 Tackling the Perishability Problem 
If the perishability of fresh cassava could be reduced, the fresh cassava trading chain 
could become considerably more efficient. The following would occur: 
• The risk of spoilage would be decreased. Traders would be willing to accept 
lower net margins. 
• Transport costs would decrease. Lower perishability would open up the 
possibility ofbulking greater quantities of fresh roots, making possible the use of 
more cost-effective large scale transport. 
• Price discovery would improve. The less frenetic pace at which the trade could be 
conducted would allow traders to access better price information and possibly 
avoid having to use commission agents. 
• Daily price volatility would decrease. Supply from rural areas would become 
steadier and there would be a greater degree of integration between markets in 
nearby towns. 
• Cassava farmers in remote areas would gain greater market access, and the burden 
on increasingly over-exploited production areas nearer to Kampala would be 
reduced. 
In the nineteen eighties, the Centro Intemacionale Agricultura Tropicale (CIAT) 
developed storage technology that increased fresh cassava shelf life from three days to 
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between two and three weeks. It relies on the selection of good quality roots, which 
are bagged in polythene as soon after harvest as possible. The high humidity that 
develops in the bags significantly reduces perishability but also promotes fungal 
growth. The latter is controlled by dipping the roots in fungicide before bagging. 
The commercial application of this technology to supply Colombian supermarkets 
with fresh roots failed. The reasons why are not entirely clear, although high costs of 
using the technology have been suggested. A more intriguing alternative explanation 
is that individuals who had vested interests in maintaining the status quo of the fresh 
cassava trade, applied pressure on the technology adherents to cease their activities. 
NRI subsequently adapted the technology for use in Ghana and Tanzania. Storage 
costs were reduced by avoiding the use of fungicides and by simplifying packaging 
requirements. Although uptake has been patchy, NRI staff involved in the project 
have confidence in the technique's efficacy and believe that insufficient resources 
were spent on promoting it to the intended beneficiaries. 
If simple fresh storage techniques prove effective in the Ugandan fresh cassava 
trading context, then at least some ofthe efficiencies outlined above could be realised. 
Ultimately, reducing the cost of fresh cassava marketing would benefit farmers, 
traders and consumers. 
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5. Marketing Constraints 
While previous sections of this report have identified constraints specific to fresh and 
dried cassava trading, this section examines a few general constraints that we believe 
are relevant to the majority of food marketing in Uganda. However, rather than repeat 
what a growing literature on the subject has already concluded9, we intend merely to 
present the new insights that our fieldwork provided. 
5.1 Liquidity 
As previously noted, liquidity problems limit the scale of individual trading 
businesses, leading to significant cost inefficiencies at the retail and wholesale levels. 
Very few traders interviewed during our surveys reported access to formal credit, 
although most claimed to borrow informally at no rate of interest from friends and 
family. Even if more formal credit was available, cautiousness among traders might 
well limit its uptake. Several traders regarded formal loans as risky because they 
entail regular interest and principal payments. This attitude may reveal that business 
performance is patchy, leading to periods when formal loans could not be serviced, 
but may also indicate that periodic demand for money to pay domestic bills would 
compete with loan repayments. 
Ultimately, increasing the amount of capital available to traders can only be achieved 
through an increase in affordable (low interest rate) lending, which in turn relies upon 
low transaction costs and good loan security. These ideal conditions for lending to 
small businesses are far from being achieved in Uganda. One approach is being 
followed by USAID, which acts as a loan guarantor for traders who borrow from 
commercial banks. Perhaps a more sustainable solution would be to provide both the 
encouragement and the correct legal environment for the formation of trader 
associations. Formal lenders could reduce their transaction costs by lending to the 
association rather than to a number of small traders. Loan security could be improved 
if the association possesses physical assets (such as a warehouse) or if association 
members' stock can be collateralised by holding it in secure warehouses (inventory 
credit). Both approaches would require tightening oflegislation to allow lenders to 
seize the collateralised assets of defaulting borrowers. 
5.2 Transport 
Of the marketing costs identified within our cost and margin estimates, transport 
charges are among the highest. Our fieldwork revealed three relevant factors. Firstly, 
transport shortages are more severe in some areas than in others. For instance, fresh 
cassava traders find little difficulty hiring trucks in Kampala, yet are often unable to 
hire trucks elsewhere. Secondly, there are type-specific as well as general shortages: 
Finding the appropriate size of vehicle is not always possible. Thirdly, transport costs 
between farms and the assembly point are disproportionately large. For dried cassava, 
this initial part of the journey costs between 1.2 and 2.4 USh per kilogram kilometre, 
whereas transport between the assembly point and the market costs approximately 0.1 
to 0.14 USh per kilogram kilometre. Local transport will always be more expensive 
9 Notably, Kleih et al (1999) and Ferris and Rob bins (1999). 
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than long-distance transport but in this case, the large discrepancy in costs suggests 
that public investments in "community access" routes and intermediate forms of 
transport should be appraised alongside investment in feeder and trunk roads. n may 
be that the benefit cost ratios of the former types of investment are higher. 
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6. Key Findings 
6.1 Dried Cassava 
• Cassava flour is an important food staple for particular consumer groups within 
Kampala's poor population. Real cassava flour prices in Kampala are volatile and 
increasing in the long term, suggesting that food-security among these groups may 
be threatened. 
• Dried cassava marketing efficiency could be increased by improving the flow of 
market information. This would lead to better spatial integration between urban 
markets (thereby reducing the absolute levels and volatility of consumer prices, 
and increasing marketing opportunities for farmers), and to a reduction of 
transaction costs throughout the marketing chain, particularly to the benefit of 
farmers. 
• Efficiency could also be improved by increasing liquidity within the dried cassava 
trading chain. Greater capital availability would allow wholesalers and retailers to 
expand the scale of their businesses and spread their overhead costs over a greater 
volume of trade. Food retailing in general has poor cost efficiency, and 
consequently consumer food prices are much higher than is necessary. In the case 
of cassava flour, retailers add approximately 36% to the price of flour in between 
buying and selling, yet the greatest part of this margin is accounted for by 
overhead costs. Retailing is a simple service and should not cost consumers so 
highly. 
• Product quality is not a problem during the dry season, when optimal drying 
conditions allow sufficient production of dried cassava that is of adequate quality 
and affordable to urban consumers. However, during the wet season, good quality 
flour becomes expensive, not only because of low levels of inter -seasonal storage 
but also because farmers are unable to dry cassava roots effectively. Appropriate 
drying technologies might improve the situation, but they would have to be both 
non-labour and non-capital intensive to find favour within prevailing farming 
systems. Promoting efficient methods of drying at the village assembler level of 
the trading chain may provide a solution. 
• Current market facilities constrain wholesaling efficiency. Competition with 
alternative land uses limits business expansion, maintains high rents, and creates 
congestion and pollution. 
• There is no evidence that any group within the trading chain makes unjustifiably 
large profits. On the contrary, excessive competition at the retail level appears to 
squeeze profits to the extent that individual retail outlets operate at an inefficiently 
small scale. 
6.2 Fresh Cassava 
• Fresh cassava trading is driven by the high perishability ofthe roots and by the 
price premia that consumers are willing to pay for freshness. 
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• Large marketing cost savings could be realised if current methods for reducing the 
perishability of cassava roots can be adapted to the meet requirements of 
Uganda's fresh cassava trade. 
• Recent cassava breeding research has neglected widespread consumer preferences 
for medium sized, sweet varieties. 
6.3 General Findings 
• Transport charges between farms and assembly points are more than ten times 
more expensive than inter-urban transport charges. Although this finding was 
made in the context of dried cassava trading, it probably applies to all 
domestically marketed farm produce, and emphasises the importance of public 
investment in reducing the costs of community level transport. 
• Lending to the food marketing sector is not only constrained by high transaction 
costs and poor loan security but also by conservative attitudes among potential 
borrowers. 
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7. Recommendations 
Many of the constraints that apply to fresh and dried cassava trading are common to 
other types of food marketing in Uganda. Examining cassava marketing in isolation 
can therefore lead to less than optimal research impact. The following are suggested 
as avenues of general food marketing research and technical assistance. 
• Formal lending to the food marketing sector: This research should concentrate on 
finding innovative lending practices that will reduce costs and risks to both 
lenders and borrowers. Ideally, it should involve traders, commercial lenders, 
government policy personnel, and legal experts. Suggestions for improving the 
legal lending environment should form a central part of the research. 
• Capturing economies of scale within food wholesaling and retailing: Building on 
the work into improved lending, this research should be broad-ranging and include 
investigation into capital, business skill, entrepreneurial, cultural, and 
infrastructural constraints. An understanding of the relevant constraints will allow 
policy makers to develop strategies to encourage larger scale wholesaling and 
retailing. 
• Improved market facility planning: If Kampala's urban authority is willing to co-
operate, we recommend development assistance aimed at improving the planning 
ofKampala's markets, with the ultimate aim of reducing marketing costs, 
improving sanitation and reducing congestion in the city centre. The work should 
engage urban planners and traders in a collaborative approach. 
The final two recommendations apply specifically to technical innovation within 
cassava marketing systems. 
• Drying technology: We do not recommend spending research funds on developing 
ways for drying cassava roots at the farm level. New drying techniques would 
only fmd relevance during the three months of the wet season. Furthermore, in 
order to find favour among farmers, drying innovations would have to satisfy the 
impossible combination ofbeing non-labour and non-capital intensive. We do 
however recommend further research on the financial viability of drying 
innovations at the village assembler level of the marketing chain, where capital 
constraints are lower. Village assemblers handle greater volumes of chips and 
may therefore be able to exploit economies of scale in the drying process. 
• Fresh cassava storage: We recommend research into the feasibility of adapting 
CIATINRI fresh cassava storage technology for use by Ugandan traders. Costs 
and benefits to the traders should form the central theme of the research. 
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Appendix 1. Grand Seasonal Index Calculations for Kampala Cassava Flour Retail Prices 
Monthly index of moving averages 
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec 
1989 106.9 107.08 98.154 103.2 92.303 112.94 109.08 
1990 117.09 110.9 100.33 102.95 94.458 100.43 95.664 97.406 98.477 98.962 99.036 96.77 
1991 94.968 93.042 93.145 96.576 93.739 108.14 112.19 101 .02 100.94 88.27 79.534 70.946 
1992 68.203 67.974 77.637 89.994 128.01 130.15 137.35 120.7 110.52 106.98 101.23 97.129 
1993 100.98 88.913 95.307 99.443 100.67 102.46 97.84 93.318 91.063 88.999 95.642 95.583 
1994 103.2 101.7 97.583 95.908 97.313 107.29 114.57 97.848 100.65 103.2 96.214 99.532 
1995 100.54 97.959 100.7 101 101 .51 99.242 99.746 100.12 103.25 100.93 95.661 98.592 
1996 98.708 98.824 98.941 98.824 100.18 97.936 92.757 92.347 89.385 91.696 104.31 100.95 
1997 106.56 105.55 98.652 90.197 89.233 94.916 102.4 100.88 99.718 105.42 118.26 116.82 
1998 107.99 105.78 97.548 98.506 94.656 101.18 91.435 100.49 101.03 104.94 96.342 94.739 
1999 100.59 104.54 99.903 100.2 99.215 95.872 86.863 
N 10 10 10 10 10 11 11 10 10 10 10 10 
Mean 99.882 97.518 95.975 97.36 99.899 104.05 103.45 100.23 99.825 98.171 99.916 98.013 
s.d. 12.687 12.236 6.8513 4.3291 10.591 9.7541 14.155 7.8038 6.042 7.2117 10.573 11.732 
s.e.(mean) 4.0118 3.8693 2.1666 1.369 3.3492 2.941 4.2678 2.4678 1.9107 2.2805 3.3434 3.7101 
t (null mean =1 00) 
-0.029 -0.641 -1.858 -1.928 -0.03 1.3762 0.8074 0.0922 -0.092 -0.802 -0.025 -0.535 
36 
Appendix 2. Dried cassava trading costs and margins 
Assumptions 
Weight of bag of ohips (kg) 
Weight ofbng of flour (kg) 
Milling losses 
Transport (farm to village assembler Ushlbag of 
chips) 
Transport (village 10 wholesaler Ushlbag of chips) 
Loading fee/bag of chips 
Real cost of capital per month 
Average wholesale storage period (months) 
Monthly rent on wholesale store (Ush) 
Average wholesale store utilisation (bags) 
Cassava flour sha.re of wholesale overheads 
Monthly rent on retail store (Us h) 
Retailtumover (IOOkg bags/month) 
Other overhead costs (Ush per month) 
Cassava flour share of retail overheads 
85 
100 
0.02 
1000 
3000 
200 
0.015 
0.5 
100000 
100 
0.5 
100000 
4 
30000 
0.15 
Costs and Margins within the Dried Cassava Trading Chain 
Usb/1 OOkg %of selling price 
Farmer 
Selling price 10000 
Vi llage assembler 
Purchase price 10000 
Selling price 12000 
Gross m:ugin 2000 16.7% 
Costs 
Transport 1176 
Net marsin 824 6.9% 
Travelling tn1der 
Purchase pnce• 12245 
Selling price• 20000 
Gross margm n55 38.8% 
Costs 
Miscellaneous labour 700 
Transport 3529 
Milling 1000 
Packaging 500 
District levy ("loading fee") 200 
Market levy 500 
TOTAL COSTS 6429 
Netmarsin,.. 1326 6.6% 
Urban Wholesaler 
Purchase price• 20000 
Selling price• 22000 
Gross margin 2000 9. 1% 
Costs 
Overheads 250 
Capital 150 
l'OTALCOSTS 400 
Net nl!lr!;in .. 1600 8.0% 
Urban Retailer 
Purchase price• 22000 
Selling price• 30000 
Gross margin 8000 26.7% 
Costs 
Overhead 4875 
Variable 300 
TOTAL COSTS 5175 
Net ma!'&in•• 2825 9.4% 
• Equivalent flour price aOer adjusting for 2% milling losses 
•• Before income tax and payment of trading licence 
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